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Trajectory-Based, Probabilistic
Risk Model for UAS Operations
Hector Usach, Juan A. Vila and Áurea Gallego
Abstract
To enable the safe integration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) into the
civil airspace, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has elaborated a new
regulatory framework that is operation-centric and risk-based. Based on this prin-
ciple, gaining authorization to conduct certain types of operations depends on a
safety risk assessment. To harmonize this process, the Joint Authorities for
Rulemaking on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) released a qualitative methodology
called Specific Operation Risk Assessment (SORA). However, SORA is not a com-
plete safety assessment tool since, in some cases, a quantitative risk analysis is still
required. This work develops a probabilistic risk model that extends SORA to
evaluate the ground risk and the air risk components along a specified UAS trajec-
tory quantitatively. The proposed model is supplied with illustrative data and is
validated in a representative UAS mission. In the future, the risk model will be
exploited to develop a decision tool for determining the minimum-risk trajectory
when multiple, alternative routes are available.
Keywords: risk assessment, UAS, SORA, Bayesian networks,
contingency management
1. Introduction
In order to harmonize the regulation of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)
across the European Union and to foster the development of the UAS market, the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is elaborating a new regulatory frame-
work that relies on the Concept of Operation (ConOps) for drones [1]. According to
this concept, UAS operations can be classified into three categories, named “open,”
“specific,” and “certified,” as summarized in Table 1. Each of these categories has
an associated regulatory regime that is proportionate to the risk of the operation.
Operations within the open category do not require prior authorization by the
competent authority. Operations within the specific category require authorization
by the competent authority based on an operational risk assessment performed by
the operator. Finally, operations within the certified category are subject to a full
certification process based on the safety objectives in [2].
The task of performing an operational risk assessment to obtain authorization
for operating a UAS is sensitive and complex. To facilitate and harmonize this
process, the Working Group 6 of the Joint Authorities for Rulemaking on
Unmanned Systems (JARUS) initiative developed the Specific Operation Risk
Assessment (SORA) methodology [3]. The SORA is a qualitative process that basi-
cally particularizes the risk assessment steps in [4] to evaluate the risks involved
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with the operation of UASs of any class and size and for any type of operation; and
ultimately to determine the corresponding mitigation measures. Although it is
specially intended for UASs operating within the specific category, it may be used as
an acceptable means of compliance with safety objectives for the certified category
as well [3].
It is to be noted, however, that although the SORA analysis is qualitative in
nature, a quantitative risk analysis is still required in some circumstances. For
instance, Annex C to the SORA document encourages the use of quantitative data to
support the qualitative assumptions and decisions regarding the strategic mitiga-
tions for the air risk. Even so, SORA does not prescribe any quantitative model from
which these data should be obtained. There exist other shortcomings regarding the
qualitative approach of the SORA process. As an example, the work in [5] identifies
a number of inconsistencies that ought to be resolved.
Given all the above, this work proposes to complement the SORA process with a
probabilistic risk model that evaluates the ground risk and the air risk components
along a specified UAS trajectory quantitatively. The quantitative data provided by
the model can be used to validate whether a particular operation (either specific or
certified) reaches the Target Level of Safety (TLS) required by regulation. More-
over, the quantitative model can be exploited not only for risk assessment purposes,
but also as a decision tool for determining the optimal trajectory in case of mission
replanning.
Several works have already proposed quantitative models to assess the risk of
UAS operations. A review of some of these models can be found in [6]. Other
examples include the work in [7]. It provides both a qualitative and a quantitative
risk analysis of UAS operations in integrated airspace: the qualitative analysis is
actually a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), while the quantitative analysis
is based on a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). However, none of the previous approaches
is consistent with the SORA framework. Conversely, the aforementioned work in
[5] follows a similar approach than the one in this work: it identifies the inconsis-
tencies of SORA and proposes to close these gaps through a complementary, math-
ematically based approach to risk assessment. In particular, it provides a simple,
probabilistic formulation of a barrier-based safety model. The difference between
[5] and the work in this chapter is that we exploit the Bayesian formulation to
model how a threat can develop into a hazard (rather than a bow-tie representa-
tion); and, especially, that we are focused on estimating the risk along a specified
flight trajectory (rather than on evaluating the effectiveness of the safety
barriers). Other risk models in the literature will also be referenced along this
work conveniently.
An important consideration is that risk models for UASs are in general highly
dependent on the ConOps under consideration, and especially on the type of air-
space where the operation takes places (e.g., airspace type and class, operating
Open category Specific category Certified category
MTOWa < 25 kg; and height< 120 m; and
in VLOSb; and Outside reserved areas
MTOW a < 25; or
height≥ 120 m; or
BVLOSc
Risks like manned aviation
(size, complexity, kinetic
energy)
No certification SORA Full certification
aMaximum take-off weight.
bVisual line of sight.
cBeyond visual line of sight.
Table 1.
EASA’s concept of operation for drones.
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altitude, encounter rate, conflict management layers available, etc.). Due to the
wide variety of ConOps that can be envisaged, it is difficult develop a model that
captures the characteristics of all the possible operating environments. So consider-
ing the research interests of the authors, this work is focused on UASs operating in
the Air Traffic Management (ATM) environment. This implies that the UAS must
comply with existing rules and procedures for manned aviation (e.g., rules of the air
or airspace structure). UASs operating in the UAS Traffic Management (UTM)
environment (e.g., ConOps proposed by the CORUS project [8]) are therefore out
of the scope of this work.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 details the ConOps
considered in this work, as well as the demonstration mission that will be used to
validate the proposed risk model. Section 3 develops the probabilistic risk model for
the proposed ConOps. Section 4 provides the validation results. Finally, Section 5
concludes the chapter and outlines future lines of research.
2. Proposed concept of operation
In order to provide a broad vision of the problem under study, this work is not
focused on a particular type of operation. Rather, the proposed ConOps describes a
wide range of flight profiles with the following general common features:
• The UAS operation is to be performed Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) of
the operator.
• The UAS operation is to be performed under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR).
When airspace requirements impose compliance with Visual Flight Rules
(VFR), airspace segregation will be necessary.
• The UAS operation may enter in controlled airspace. The operation may also
take-off or land at a controlled airport. Therefore, coordination with the
corresponding Air Traffic Control (ATC) authority is compulsory.
Additionally, the UAS can fly under non-conventional ATC services not
included in controlled areas; for example, an ATC unit that acts specifically at
the operations area, similar to the one used to coordinate the operations in a
firefighting.
• The UAS operation is to take place out of urban areas.
Due to the inherent complexity of the proposed ConOps, it is assumed that
Unmanned Aircraft (UA) models capable of flying these missions will be compara-
ble to manned aircraft in terms of size and complexity. A representative UA that
will be used for demonstration purposes is the IAI Super Heron model. Further-
more, the UAS will be remotely piloted by an operator (called remote pilot); and the
communication between the remote pilot and the UA will be conducted using a
Command and Control (C2) data link. So, the UAS will actually be a Remotely
Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), which includes the Remotely Piloted Aircraft
(RPA), the remote pilot station(s), and the C2 link.
2.1 Demonstration mission description
One among all the possible missions described by this, ConOps will be used to
validate the probabilistic risk model discussed below. The proposed mission consists
3
Trajectory-Based, Probabilistic Risk Model for UAS Operations
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90688
of a route from a departure airport to an operations area; a series of maneuvers
within this area; and finally a route toward the destination airport. In particular, in
the proposed demonstration mission, represented in Figure 1, the UAS must depart
from the uncontrolled airport of Teruel (International Civil Aviation Organization
Figure 1.
Demonstration mission.
Segment # Segment
type
Waypoint sequence Remark
1 Departure LETL! VWP1!MANDY Uncontrolled airspace
2 En-route MANDY! CLS! RETBA!MOPIR
! LASPO
Controlled airways R29 and M871
3 Ingress LASPO! F15B2 Uncontrolled airspace
4 Operations F15B2! VWP2! F15B2 Uncontrolled airspace
5 Egress F15B2! VLC VFR corridor
6 En-route VLC! SOPET Controlled airway B26
7 Arrival SOPET! TATOS!NIBEN! LECH Standard arrival SOPET1S
Table 2.
Route specification for the demonstration mission.
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(ICAO) code LETL) to perform some direct observations over the Albufera’s natu-
ral park in Spain; and then land at the controlled airport of Castellón (LECH). The
operations area has well-specified limits (defined by perimeter F15B in Figure 1)
which must be enforced using a geo-awareness system. In addition, given that this
area is located within the Controlled Traffic Region (CTR) of the València Airport
(ICAO code LEVC), the mission will require special permission from Air Traffic
Service (ATS) authorities. To perform this mission, a route connecting the depar-
ture site, the operations area, and the arrival site must be specified. The proposed
route is composed of 14 flight legs, which are structured into seven flight segments
(described in Table 2), and which have been constructed in compliance with the
Spanish Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) [9]. The risk assessment results of
this mission will be presented in Section 4.
3. Probabilistic risk model compliant with the SORA framework
In order to develop a probabilistic risk model that is consistent with the SORA
framework, it is necessary to account with the Holistic Risk Model (HRM) behind
the SORA methodology. In short, the HRM is focused on the occurrence of a single,
generic hazard, named “UAS operation out of control,”1 an emergency condition
with the potential to provoke three possible harms: fatal injuries to third parties on
the ground, fatal injuries to third parties in the air or damage to critical infrastruc-
tures. At the same time, the out of control condition can originate from different
threats, like a technical error, a human error, etc. Further details can be found on
Version 1 of the SORA document [3].
To estimate the likelihood of occurrence of each of the previous harm categories
(here expressed as Pharm), the Version 1 of the SORA document mentions a mathe-
matical model that depends on three factors: the probability of being out of control
(Pooc), the conditional probability of striking the entity of value (i.e., third parties
on the ground or in the air, or critical infrastructures) once the operation is out of
control (Pstrike=ooc), and the conditional probability of causing the given harm if the
strike has actually occurred (Pharm=strike):
Pharm ¼ Pooc Pstrike=ooc Pharm=strike (1)
However, SORA does not further detail this model since SORA is a risk assess-
ment methodology of a qualitative nature. This work will use Eq. (1) as the basis to
develop a quantitative, probabilistic risk model for UAS operations. To do so,
Eq. (1) will first be rearranged for convenience so that it is expressed as a function
of the probability of impact (Pimpact) rather than the probability of being out of
control. In the sequence of events of a UAS mishap, the “impact” event is an
intermediate condition between the out of control event and the event of striking a
third party, see Figure 2. Having this in mind, Pimpact can be expressed as:
Pimpact ¼ Pooc Pimpact=ooc (2)
where Pimpact=ooc is the conditional probability of having an impact given the out
of control condition. Eq. (1) can thus be rewritten as follows with minor effort:
1
In Version 2 of the SORA document, the SORA hazard was renamed as “loss of control.” However, this
work retains the original name of the hazard to better differentiate it from the “loss of control in-flight”
condition, which refers to the aircraft stall.
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Pharm ¼ Pimpact Pstrike=impact Pharm=strike (3)
Note, however, that the likelihood of occurrence of an aircraft accident is usually
expressed as the number of occurrences per flight hour, not as a probability.
Therefore, Eq. (3) can be rewritten in terms of rate of occurrence as follows:
λharm ¼ λimpact Pstrike=impact Pharm=strike (4)
where λharm is the rate at which the harm under analysis occurs (per flight hour),
and λimpact is the rate at which the impact event is expected to occur (also per flight
hour). In general, Eq. (4) expresses an instant risk as the different terms involved
in this equation can vary along space and time. For example, the probability of
striking a third party on the ground depends on the population density in the
vicinity of the impact area. The aim of this work is to assess the risk posed by a UAS
flying a given trajectory r ¼ r tð Þ, t∈ a, b½ , a< b, where r tð Þ is a curve C between
two points r að Þ and r bð Þ. Therefore, in order to compute the overall risk along a
defined flight path, it is necessary to perform the line integral of Eq. (4) along the
curve C between r að Þ and r bð Þ:
Λharm ¼ ∮ Cλharm rð Þ ds ¼
ðb
a
λharm r tð Þð Þ ∥r0 tð Þ∥ dt (5)
where ds is an elementary arc length. Note that Eq. (5) is expressed in terms of
occurrences per hour of operation along a specified distance ( s1 m½  using the
International System of Units). Then, the average risk along this trajectory in terms
of occurrences per flight hour is given by:
λharm ¼
Λharm
L Cð Þ
(6)
where L Cð Þ ¼ ∮ Cds is the length of the curve C between r að Þ and r bð Þ (i.e., the
length of the planned trajectory). Next, Eq. (5) will be particularized to assess the
risk of causing fatal injuries to third parties on the ground (hereinafter ground risk),
and to third parties in the air (hereinafter air risk). Due to lack of data and time
constraints, the risk of causing damage to critical infrastructures will not be assessed
in this work.
3.1 Ground risk model
In order to derive the ground risk component (denoted as ΛG) from Eq. (5), it is
necessary to develop an impact model (term λimpact in Eq. (4)), a strike model (term
Figure 2.
Sequence of events of a UAS mishap.
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Pstrike=impact), and a harm model (Pharm=strike). The proposed models for these terms
are discussed next.
3.1.1 Impact model
The ground impact model provides the rate at which a ground impact occurs
(λimpact). In the literature, this term is often assumed to be constant and is either
estimated based on historical accident data, component failure data, and expert
judgment [10, 11], or deduced from the TLS required by regulation [12–14]. By
contrast, this work suggests modeling λimpact using Bayesian Belief Networks
(BBNs), which provides two major advantages:
1.The model can be supplied with both qualitative and quantitative data
simultaneously [15]. This is specially useful in models with high degree of
uncertainty, like in the problem under study.
2.Probabilistic inference can be used to replace an initial assumption regarding
one model variable by a perceived evidence regarding this variable and then,
the model automatically updates the remaining probabilities based on the
presence of such evidence [16]. In practice, this capability can be used to
update the probability of a ground impact given the real-time state of the
system (for instance, depending on whether the C2 link is loss or alive).
The proposed BBN describing the ground impact model is represented in
Figure 3. As it can be observed, the model is described by a directed, acyclic graph
where nodes represent variables and edges represent the conditional dependencies
between these variables. Each node variable is associated with a Bayesian probabil-
ity that is expressed with a Conditional Probability Table (CPT). In this case, the
sink node represents the probability of a ground impact (Pimpact), and the remaining
nodes describe the sequence of events between the initiating factors and the
expected outcome. Therefore, the probability of a “ground impact” depends on the
combined likelihood of experiencing a “loss of control in-flight” and a “boundary
violation” condition (i.e., exceeding the operational limits approved for the opera-
tion), see Figure 3. At the same time, these abnormal flight conditions can be
caused by an “inappropriate guidance,” i.e., a guidance command that is not suit-
able for the current state of the aircraft (because it exceeds the flight envelope
limits, because it is not consistent with the approved Mission Plan, etc.). In addi-
tion, the “boundary violation” can also result from a “navigation error” like the loss
of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal. The “inappropriate guid-
ance” is based on the combined effect of an “autopilot malfunction” (including loss
of function and malfunction) and “pilot ineffectiveness.” The human pilot is con-
sidered to be “ineffective”when she or he takes a wrong guidance decision, or when
a correct decision is badly executed (e.g., selection of an inappropriate control
mode, poor piloting skills, etc.). The source of an “autopilot malfunction” or a “pilot
ineffectiveness” condition may be the use of incorrect navigation information
caused by a “navigation error.” Finally, the pilot may also be “ineffective” when she
or he is not in the control loop due to the “C2 link loss.”
In order to obtain the output probability Pimpact, it is necessary to define the
CPTs of each of the events of the previous BBN. As it can be observed, these events
basically include technical errors (e.g., “navigation error,” “autopilot malfunction,”
etc.) and human errors (e.g., “pilot ineffective”). The CPT of an event cataloged as
a technical error can be obtained from the technical specifications or can be
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deduced from system tests. By contrast, the CPT of an event cataloged as a human
error depends on human factors like type of activity being carried out, workload,
etc. Some authors have already attempted to develop human performance models
for specific activities (e.g., ATC controllers [17] or pilots of manned aircraft [18]).
However, the development of a detailed human performance model is a vast task
that exceeds the scope of this work. For this reason, we will calibrate the proposed
model using technical data when possible, and illustrative data from experts’ judg-
ment otherwise, see the Appendix. The output data will be assumed to be repre-
sentative of the case study, although it should be validated in a future stage using
some of the approaches proposed in the literature (e.g., see [19, 20]).
Another important remark regarding the previous model is that it provides the
probability of the occurrence of the ground impact event (Pimpact), not the failure
rate (λimpact). In order to derive λimpact from Pimpact, it is necessary to assume a given
probability distribution function. As in similar approaches in the literature (e.g., see
[15, 21]), this work assumes that Pimpact follows a Poisson distribution, so λimpact is
given by:
λimpact ¼  ln 1 Pimpact
 
(7)
3.1.2 Strike model
The strike model represents the conditional probability that an impact at a
specific location strikes a person. To model this term, this work will use a widely
accepted model in the literature [10–13, 16, 22]:
Figure 3.
Ground impact BBN model.
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Pstrike=impact rð Þ ¼ ρG rð Þ LA (8)
where ρG rð Þ is the population density at the impact point, and LA is the lethal
area of the airborne platform. Census data are often used to estimate ρG rð Þ [10, 14,
16, 23]. With respect to the lethal area, two crash modes are often considered in the
literature: vertical free fall [10, 22, 23] and unpremeditated, gliding descent [10, 11,
13, 16]. For simplicity, this work assumes that the ground impact occurs following
a vertical free fall so that the impact location is close to the point where the
initiating failure has occurred. Therefore:
LA ¼ pi
max wua,Luað Þ
2
þ Rp
 2
(9)
where wua is the UA wingspan, Lua is the UA length, and Rp is the radius of an
average person. Note that LA is thus a constant parameter because none of these
terms vary with the aircraft trajectory.
3.1.3 Harm model
The harm caused to a person after a strike depends on multiple factors, including
type of UA (e.g., size, fragility, etc.), conditions at the point of impact (e.g., speed,
position), or secondary effects like explosions, etc. [24]. However, in compliance
with the SORA approach, this work assumes the worst-case condition where: (1)
there are no sheltering structures that mitigate the effect of a ground impact, and
(2) any direct impact of a UA causes the instant death of the people involved in
the accident. Therefore:
Pcasualty=strike rð Þ ¼ 1 (10)
So, in summary, the proposed ground risk model is given by:
ΛG ¼ LA
ðb
a
λimpact r tð Þð Þ ρG r tð Þð Þ ∥r
0 tð Þ∥ dt (11)
3.2 Air risk model
As in the case of the ground risk, deriving the air risk component (denoted
as ΛA) from Eq. (5) requires to develop an impact model (term λimpact in Eq. (4)),
a strike model (term Pstrike=impact), and a harm model (Pharm=strike). The proposed
approach to develop these terms is discussed next.
3.2.1 Impact model
The air impact model provides the rate at which a Mid-Air Collision (MAC)
between two aircraft occurs (λimpact). In the literature, this term is often modeled
using the Maxwell molecule formulation [21, 23, 25], which assumes that the air
traffic behaves randomly in airspace, and thus that the rate at which a MAC occurs
is proportional to the traffic density in the operational volume. However, this
theory does not contemplate the conflict management layers available in the air-
space [26], schematized in Figure 4; and, for this reason, it does not adequately
represent traffics operating in the ATM framework. To overcome this, this work
proposes to develop the air impact model following the same approach than in the
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ground impact: using BBNs. In particular, two BBNs will be developed: one for
segments performed in controlled airspace and other for uncontrolled airspace.
3.2.1.1 Mid-air collision model for segments performed in controlled airspace
The proposed mid-air collision BBN model for flight segments performed in
controlled airspace is represented in Figure 5. The output node of this model is the
“MAC” node which has an associated probability Pimpact. The sequence of events
leading to this flight condition depends on two major events: the “separation error”
and the “collision avoidance error.” As it is shown in Figure 4, the “separation
error” occurs when both “strategic separation” and “tactical separation” fail. “Stra-
tegic separation error” basically refers to the failure of the procedural separation
mechanism, while “tactical separation error” involves the ATC surveillance capa-
bility. The “tactical separation error” node probability depends on the combined
likelihood of the corresponding ATC unit being “ineffective” and the remote pilot
performing an “inappropriate guidance.” ATC is ineffective when a possible con-
flict is not detected, or when ATC provides an incorrect clearance. This node
probability certainly depends on the “traffic density”2 in the area. “Inappropriate
guidance” refers to conditions where the ATC clearance is not correctly executed by
the remote pilot. Note that the probability of experiencing an “inappropriate guid-
ance” depends on the same sequence of events than in the ground impact BBN
model described in Section 3.1.1.
Once the “separation error” occurs, collision avoidance layers can still prevent
the MAC from occurring. In controlled airspace, it is assumed that aircraft will be
equipped with a transponder. Therefore, collision avoidance can be performed at
two levels with a different time horizon. At a first level, Traffic alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) can trigger a traffic alert/resolution advisory. The effec-
tiveness of this layer depends on the remote pilot because it is assumed that she or
he must still approve or reject the resolution advisory. If the TCAS alert results
“ineffective,” then the Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) condition will occur. After
this happens, a second collision avoidance mechanism can still reduce the probabil-
ity of a MAC impact by performing an evasion maneuver seconds after the point of
closest approach. This maneuver may be either a See and Avoid (SAA)-based
maneuver performed by the remote pilot, or a Detect and Avoid (DAA)-based
Figure 4.
Conflict management layers in UAS. Credit: Drone icon by Anthony Lui from the Noun Project.
2
Note that, in Figure 5, the “traffic density” node has a rectangular shape instead of an ellipse. This
notation emphasizes that this node is not a probabilistic node, but a decision node, i.e., a node
representing an input variable of the model. In other words, the traffic density is considered to be known
at a given airspace volume.
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maneuver performed by the automatic system (if a DAA system is equipped
onboard the UAS). A “DAA error” may occur if the onboard sensors are unable to
detect the conflicting traffic. SAA may be “ineffective” when the remote pilot has a
reduced situational awareness, or when the pilot is not in the control loop due to the
“C2 link loss.” Finally, as in the ground impact model, this work assumes that the
MAC event follows a Poisson distribution so λimpact can be deduced from Pimpact
using Eq. (7).
3.2.1.2 Mid-air collision model for segments performed in uncontrolled airspace
The proposed mid-air collision BBN model for flight segments performed in
uncontrolled airspace is represented in Figure 6. As in the BBNmodel for controlled
airspace, the output node is the “MAC” node which has an associated probability
Pimpact. However, as it can be observed in the figure, the sequence of events leading
to this flight condition differs when flying in uncontrolled airspace. To start with,
separation provision is independent of the ATC service. In this case, the main
separation mechanism is the definition of the mission boundaries and the use of
Figure 5.
Mid-air collision BBN model in controlled airspace.
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geofencing to enforce these boundaries. However, a “boundary violation” may
occur due to “inappropriate guidance” or because of a “navigation error.” Once the
“boundary violation” occurs, the likelihood of experiencing a “separation error”
increases with the “traffic density” in the area.
Even if the UAS flies within the specified boundaries, other traffics may also be
encountered in the same operational volume. For this reason, the remote pilot is
required to “remain well clear” of other aircraft at all times. However, the remote
pilot may fail at remaining well clear because she or he performs an “inappropriate
guidance.” The proposed model assumes that the likelihood of the remote pilot
failing at remaining well clear increases with the “traffic density” because of the
increased pilot workload.
The other key difference when operating in uncontrolled airspace is that aircraft
are not required to be equipped with a transponder. Therefore, one cannot assume
that an intruder aircraft will be a cooperative traffic, what makes the TCAS layer
inoperative. As a result, after a “separation error” occurs, the “NMAC” condition is
assumed to happen, and the only feasible collision avoidance mechanism is the SAA
or DAA maneuver. This is one of the factors that certainly increases the operational
risk when flying in uncontrolled airspace.
Figure 6.
Mid-air collision BBN model for uncontrolled airspace.
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3.2.2 Strike model
The strike model represents the conditional probability that an impact between
two aircraft strikes a person in the air. In the case of a UAS operation, an impact is
expected to cause a strike only if the transient aircraft is a manned aircraft. There-
fore, the strike model should account for the ratio between manned and unmanned
aircraft in the vicinity of the operating area. For simplicity, this work assumes
that all mid-air collisions involve a manned aircraft as long as the UAS is not
performing a formation flight with other UAs. This way, all impacts are supposed to
result in a strike:
Pstrike=impact ¼ ρA rð Þ (12)
where ρA rð Þ is the number of people onboard the collided aircraft. In order to
estimate this term, it is necessary to characterize the aircraft flying in the airspace
volume where the operation takes place. For example, it is possible to assume that
most aircraft flying a controlled airway will be airliners, while most aircraft flying in
uncontrolled airspace will be general aviation aircraft.
3.2.3 Harm model
The harm model determines the likelihood of causing fatal injuries to people
onboard the collided aircraft once the strike between the UAS and the manned
aircraft has occurred. As in the case of the ground risk model, this work assumes the
worst-case condition where all strikes result in a casualty:
Pcasualty=strike ¼ 1 (13)
So, in summary, the proposed air risk model is given by:
ΛA ¼
ðb
a
λimpact r tð Þð Þ ρA r tð Þð Þ ∥r
0 tð Þ∥ dt (14)
4. Validation results
The probabilistic risk model in Section 3 has been implemented in Matlab and
has been supplied with the illustrative data in the Appendix. To validate this model,
a risk assessment will be performed for the demonstration mission in Section 2.1. In
particular, the risk assessment will be performed considering six different opera-
tional conditions of the UAS (named as OC1 to OC6), described in Table 3. The
ID Operational condition DAA equipped
OC1 Nominal condition None
OC2 Autonomous condition (C2 link loss) None
OC3 Degraded navigation condition (GNSS signal loss) None
OC4 Nominal condition RTCA SC-228 compliant
OC5 Autonomous condition (C2 link loss) RTCA SC-228 compliant
OC6 Degraded navigation condition (GNSS signal loss) RTCA SC-228 compliant
Table 3.
Operational conditions evaluated in the risk assessment.
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results obtained are shown in Figure 7, where each subfigure shows the ground risk
component and the air risk component along each flight leg of the demonstration
mission, considering a specific operational condition.
As it can be observed, the air risk component is the main contribution to the
total risk whenever a DAA system is not equipped onboard the UAS (Figure 7a–c).
However, this risk component can be almost entirely removed if a DAA system is
equipped and it complies with the Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS) of RTCA SC-228 [27] (the most stringent requirements required by SORA,
almost an ideal DAA). When it comes to the ground risk component, it becomes a
determining factor specially when overflying high population density areas like the
metropolitan area of València (corresponding to flight legs 8 to 11, see Figure 1).
Another interesting result that can be deduced from Figure 7 is that the loss of
the C2 link has a greater impact on the air risk than on the ground risk (what is in
Figure 7.
Risk assessment results: Ground risk and air risk components in each flight leg of the demonstration mission.
(a) Operational condition OC1. (b) Operational condition OC2. (c) Operational condition OC3.
(d) Operational condition OC4. (e) Operational condition OC5. (f) Operational condition OC6.
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line with the results in [7]). This is due to the fact that, during this abnormal flight
condition, the remote pilot is unable to intervene in the operation; and consequently
tactical separation, TCAS and SAA conflict management layers are not effective.
Conversely, the results obtained indicate that the loss of the GNSS signal is slightly
more critical when it comes to the ground risk than to the air risk.
Finally, Table 4 shows the cumulative risk when considering the entire demon-
stration mission. Note that the cumulative risk Λ is computed by adding the ground
risk component and the air risk component along all the flight legs of the planned
trajectory; while the average risk λ is computed from Λ using Eq. (6). As an
example, the cumulative risk when the UAS operates in OC1 is Λ ¼ 9:29 
102 h1NM; although it can be reduced down to Λ ¼ 1:04  102 h1NMby means
of the DAA capability (OC4). Considering that the estimated path length for this
route is L ¼ 199 NM, the average risk in these conditions is λ ¼ 4:67  104 h1 and
λ ¼ 5:23  105 h1, respectively.
5. Conclusions
Current regulatory framework for the operation of UAS in Europe is operation-
centric and risk-based. Based on this framework, the authorization for conducting a
specific mission is given on the basis of an operational risk assessment performed by
the operator. In order to facilitate and harmonize this process, EASA established a
qualitative risk assessment methodology called SORA. However, SORA is not a
complete safety assessment tool because quantitative results are still required to
demonstrate that a specific operation can be conducted safely.
In this chapter, a probabilistic risk model for UAS operations is proposed. The
proposed model estimates the likelihood of occurrence of a catastrophic accident
when a UAS flies a specified trajectory. One of the main novelties of the proposed
model is that it is consistent with the HRM of SORA. Therefore, the probabilistic
model can be used to support the qualitative assumptions and decisions taken by the
SORA applicant.
The risk model must be supplied with a number of input parameters such as
aircraft model, population density or traffic density, among others. The degree of
uncertainty about these parameters will determine the trustworthiness of the results
obtained. In this work, illustrative data is used to validate the model in a demon-
stration mission for different operational conditions. Results show that the C2 link
loss event is more critical to the air risk that to the ground risk. Conversely, the loss
of the GNSS signal has a greater impact on the probability of experiencing a ground
impact than a MAC, according to the results.
Operational condition Λ h1NM
 
λ h1
 
OC1 9.29e-02 4.67e-04
OC2 1.47e-01 7.39e-04
OC3 1.09e-01 5.48e-04
OC4 1.04e-02 5.23e-05
OC5 1.64e-02 8.24e-05
OC6 1.82e-02 9.15e-05
Table 4.
Cumulative risk and average risk when the UAS flies the demonstration mission in different operational
conditions.
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Future work is to make use of Bayesian inference to update the state of knowl-
edge about the system parameters and provide confidence in the approach. Another
line of research is to adapt or extend the risk model to account for future Very Low
Level (VLL), high density airspace like the UTM/U-space, where an encounter
between two UA is more likely to occur than one with a manned aircraft. Finally,
the risk model will be used to determine the minimum-risk trajectory when multi-
ple, alternative routes are available (e.g., after an in-flight contingency occurs).
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Appendix: model data
This appendix provides the illustrative data used to estimate the ground risk and
the air risk from Eqs. (11) and (14), respectively.
A.1. Ground risk model data
The model parameters of Eq. (11) are LA, λimpact, and ρG. To estimate the lethal
area LA, it is necessary to specify the UA dimensions and the average person model.
In this case, it is assumed that the intended mission will be performed using the IAI
Super Heron model, which has a wingspan and length of 16:6 and 8:5 m, respec-
tively [28]. An average person is usually modeled as a cylinder of height Hp ¼
1:75 m and radius Rp ¼ 0:25 m [23]. To estimate the ground impact event rate
λimpact from the BBN model, it is necessary to specify the CPT for all the nodes in
Figure 3. As an example, the CPT used for the “C2 link loss” node is shown in
Table 5 (which assumes that the corresponding Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) is 1 h); while the CPT for the “Inappropriate guidance” node is shown in
Table 6. The remaining tables can be found in [29], but are here omitted for
C2 link loss
F T
3.6788e-01 6.3212e-01
Table 5.
CPT for “C2 link loss” node.
Autopilot malfunc. Pilot ineffective Inappropriate guidance
F T
F F 1 0
F T 0 1
T F 0 1
T T 0 1
Table 6.
CPT for “inappropriate guidance” node.
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brevity. Finally, to compute the population distribution ρG, we have accessed the
Spanish census data provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadística (Spanish Statis-
tics Institute) (INE) in [30], and we have processed it using the ArcGis software.
The resulting data has been converted to a raster image with a cell size of 1 1 km
(represented in Figure 8) and has been exported to Matlab.
A.2. Air risk model data
The model parameters of Eq. (14) are λimpact and ρA. In this proposal, λimpact
varies along the aircraft trajectory r tð Þ as a function of the airspace class where the
operation takes place (basically on whether it is controlled or not) and the aircraft
density in each operational volume. The airspace class is an evidence for this model,
since it is implicit in the route specification (see Table 2). To obtain the traffic
density, this work has exploited the Network Strategic Modeling Tool (NEST)
software by European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol),
which provides a dataset comprising 31.626 real cooperative flights operated in
Europe during AIRAC cycle 1307, see Figure 9. Then, the CPTs for all the event
Figure 8.
Population density in Spain (excluding the Canary Islands) based on census data from INE.
Figure 9.
NEST screenshot showing traffics flying over waypoint SOPET on July 18, 2013.
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nodes in Figures 5 and 6 are specified considering the possible traffic densities in
the mission; see [29] for further details. Finally, to estimate the number of people
onboard the manned aircraft involved in the MAC (ρA), this work assumes that
the most probable intruder aircraft when flying in controlled airspace is a short-to-
medium-range airliner like a Boeing 737 or an Airbus A320 (two of the world’s most
successful commercial airliners), with an estimated capacity of ρA ¼ 180 passen-
gers. When flying in uncontrolled airspace, the intruder aircraft is assumed to be a
general aviation aircraft like a Cessna 172 or a Piper PA-28 Cherokee, with an
estimated capacity of ρA ¼ 4 passengers.
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